

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE ARMY RESERVE: RELEVANT TODAY, MORE RELEVANT TOMORROW

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ABSTRACT

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Since the creation of the Army Reserve in 1908, it has been a key component of the National Military Strategy of the United States. When called upon in times of crisis, many perceived it was not ready. This paper will review the evolution of the Army Reserve and how it was created as a supplementary force under the Total Force Policy. It will also examine how the Army Reserve responded when called upon during Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Operations Enduring/Iraqi Freedom. Next, this paper will review how the Army Reserve is evolving to better support the active component with the modular force known as the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force. Lastly, this paper will review changes that will enhance the Army Reserve's capability to provide trained and ready personnel and units, and make recommendations to ensure the force is ready to deploy when called.

THE ARMY RESERVE: RELEVANT TODAY, MORE RELEVANT TOMORROW

Today's Army Reserve is a vital part of the Total Force Team. Built in 1970 upon the foundation laid by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird when he introduced the Total Force Concept, the Army Reserve has evolved from what was called a supplementary force to be called upon after active forces have begun an operation, to what the Chief, Army Reserve, LTG Helmly, now calls a "complementary force" that enhances the active component forces before, during, or after an operation.¹ Since the use of Army Reserve has increased with the implementation of Total Force Policy in 1973, mobilization timelines and procedures for mobilizing reservists have come under scrutiny. Current operational requirements, as well as the planned utilization of the Army Reserve in future "unknown" crises, warrant a review of how Army Reserve units are identified for mobilization and the mobilization policies and procedures to deploy the Army Reserve to meet these future challenges. This paper will review the Total Force Policy and how the Army Reserve has responded when called for a crisis. Lastly, it will review how the Army Reserve is changing to be ready and relevant for future requirements. The goal of this paper is to make recommendations to ensure the success of the Army team in the future.

Evolution of the Army Reserve as a Force in Reserve

Congress originally established the Army Reserve in 1908 as the Medical Reserve Corps to provide a reservoir of trained officers in times of war.² It was clear Congress intended to ensure that a trained force was available to augment active forces in times of crisis or national emergency. While no one in 1908 could predict when, how, or in what capacity it would be used in the future, over the next 50 years the Army Reserve seemed to be utilized as an augmentation force in keeping with Congressional intent. In both World Wars where the United States waged war in numerous theaters and in Korea, the Army Reserve provided a significant force that augmented active component capabilities. In World War I, approximately 18,000 personnel came from the Army Reserve.³ In World War II, the Army Reserve significantly contributed to enlargement of the army with the mobilization of 1940 after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Army Reserve again contributed sizeable forces to fight alongside the active duty forces and participated in the many campaigns along the way.

After North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel in 1950, the Army Reserve was extensively used in the Korean War. In fact, the Army Reserve provided 971 units which comprised over 200,000 soldiers for the Korean War.⁴ Although the Korean War was shorter in duration than both World Wars, the large-scale use of Army Reserve forces reinforced the

requirement to have a strong standing force in reserve. After each of the three major conflicts in the first half of the 20th century, the Army Reserve reverted to a smaller force, and the soldiers returned to their civilian lives. Having participated in three major wars in the 20th century, it appeared routine for the reserves to augment the active component during large-scale conflict. That would not be the case with the next conflict the Army became engaged in, the Viet Nam War, which saw only a limited mobilization of the Army Reserve.

The Viet Nam War changed the paradigm of how wars would be fought using the Reserve Components in this country. The war was similar to previous conflicts in that it was a protracted war that required a large active force, but dissimilar in that it lasted longer than the previous wars of the 20th Century. “It took three years after the commitment of major combat units in Viet Nam in 1965 to authorize a limited Viet Nam War call-up.”⁵ Although Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recommended to President Lyndon Johnson a call-up of 235,000 Reservists in July 1965, the President decided against using the reserves, and there was no large-scale mobilization.⁶ President Johnson later explained to his National Security Council (NSC) his thoughts and approach to confronting the Viet Nam War. President Johnson believed that calling up the Reserves (and other functions associated with their use such as declaring a state of emergency, increased funding requirements, etc.) would be regarded as an escalation in posture, which would lead to North Viet Nam asking its allies for help which would result in increased aid and a build up to major war. Not wanting an escalation in Southeast Asia, President Johnson decided against a major use of the Reserves.⁷

When President Johnson made the decision not to call-up the Reserves in 1965, perhaps he denied his administration one of the key benefits of mobilizing the reserves, that is, to mobilize the country behind the war. Although the President was concerned of perceptions and responses from communist supporters of Viet Nam surrounding a mobilization, most notably China and the Soviet Union, his decision could have also been an attempt to cover the build-up in Southeast Asia. Regardless, it would prove difficult to contain communism around the globe with just the active forces. The Cold War required a large commitment of active duty military personnel forward deployed in both Europe and the Pacific to counter the Soviet threat. The commitment of forces to South Viet Nam also tapped the active forces as well. Many in the Army had hoped and continued to plan for a major mobilization, but it never occurred.⁸ As world events unfolded in 1968 which included the seizing of the USS Pueblo by the North Koreans, the Tet Offensive in Viet Nam, and intelligence reporting of a possible crisis in Berlin, President Johnson ordered the mobilization of select Reserve Components. Although not originally included in the call-up, the Army Reserve was subsequently called to provide limited support in

Viet Nam.⁹ However, the lack of a major mobilization served as a significant event to some in key military leaders. It also led to a determination to find new ways to ensure all the Reserve Component was an integral part of any future armed conflict or crisis.

Total Force Concept/Policy

The cost to maintain force structure and equipment to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War, while simultaneously fighting a costly protracted war in Viet Nam, increased the Department of Defense's budget significantly. The department had to find a way to reduce its overall operating costs. In August 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird directed the services to integrate its active component with its reserve component forces under the Total Force Concept. The concept sought to integrate the forces to maximize effects, that is, to maintain as small as possible active force that commitments would allow, and reduce overall costs of the armed forces.¹⁰ As the military draft came to an end in 1973, reliance on the Reserves became ever more critical for force generation in times of conflict. After becoming Secretary of Defense in July 1973, James Schlesinger adopted the Total Force concept as policy and directed its implementation throughout the services.

The Abrams Doctrine

When the Total Force concept was adopted, General Creighton Abrams was the Chief of Staff, Army. He had previously served as the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, and later, Deputy Commander and Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command – Viet Nam, and was keenly aware of the lack of a major call up of Reserves for Viet Nam. General Abrams embraced the Total Force Policy and directed the integration of the Army's components to gain much needed ready forces capable of executing missions in times of crisis. "Many have argued that his intent was to so closely integrate the Army Reserve and Army National Guard with the active Army that it would guarantee the support of the American people and their political leadership at the outset of any conflict."¹¹ The fundamental shift to the Total Force Policy provided that henceforth the active component would have to rely on the reserve components.

Alignment for War

A significant piece of the new philosophy was an alignment of reserve units with active units. Initially developed as the Affiliation Program in 1973, and later updated and expanded in 1976 and 1980, the goal was to improve the operational readiness and training of reserve component high priority units (combat) by aligning them with active component units.¹² The 1976 expansion included combat support and combat service support affiliations. This new

focus became a turning point for the Army Reserve as it provided the means for developing long-term focused training programs. It also provided focus on readiness and enabled the active component to reinforce standards during training events for the reserve forces, which would prove helpful should they be called upon in future operations.

The overall success of these programs led to new initiatives and goals in 1980 that resulted in a transition to a larger, more comprehensive, program known as the CAPSTONE Program.¹³ The CAPSTONE program sought to further develop the Total Force Policy by integrating reserve component forces into war plans.¹⁴ The integration of units in war plans further aided commanders by focusing them on specific missions the active component had determined based on war plans and anticipated arrival dates in a theater of operations. As the program developed, force structure changes were implemented to assign capabilities not needed in the active army force, but were needed in times of emergency, to the Army Reserve and National Guard.¹⁵ A key aspect of the force realignment was the “Offsite Agreement”¹⁶ in 1993 which reduced the number of Combat Arms units in the Army Reserve and moved them into the National Guard, thus enabling the Army Reserve to develop its niche in the Combat Support and Combat Service Support branches. Some senior retired Army Reserve leaders were openly critical of the agreement and felt it undermined the Army Reserve.¹⁷ The criticism did not forestall progress and the additional focus and funding for the Army Reserve allowed its strategy to build trained units able to be alerted to report to a mobilization station for additional training prior to being deployed. The strategy, known as “alert-mobilize-train-deploy,” became “doctrine” and provided a basis to better plan unit functions such as training and administration. It also focused efforts to maximize readiness during inactive duty training assemblies and annual training. The CAPSTONE Program was further revised and updated in 1994 to provide units with detailed information concerning their wartime mission.¹⁸

The WARTRACE Program, as it evolved into its most current form, became the “deliberate alignment of Army Forces under specified wartime commanders in order to conduct wartime planning in support of U.S. national military strategic strategy.”¹⁹ The culmination of this program was what the Army Reserve had long desired and requested – detailed planning guidance - that would better focus commanders and the use of valuable resources (most importantly time) to prepare for contingencies and pre-mobilization training. Further enhancement was funding and equipment that were also tied to assigned missions. Although throughout its evolution the WARTRACE Program provided key planning information for the Army Reserve as part of the Total Force Policy, there were critics that believed it did not do enough to prepare for their mobilization missions.

Operations Desert Shield/Storm: The First Total Force Policy Test

Many have argued that the Total Force Policy had little substance to it, and it was just words to gain force structure and funding for the Army. Others viewed the policy as an evolutionary process to facilitate change in the Army and create a more cohesive force to deter any future adversary. Yet others argued that it further reinforced that never again would the Army fight a major war without the Reserves. There is probably truth to some degree in all of these assessments of the policy; however, Operations Desert Shield/Storm would be the first real test of the Total Force Policy.²⁰

After Iraq's invasion of its small neighbor, Kuwait, on August 2, 1990, and Kuwait's request for assistance from the United States, it became apparent a build up of forces would be necessary to demonstrate U.S. resolve in the region. Within days, active component forces deployed to Saudi Arabia. However, there was much uncertainty about what additional force and how quickly it would be needed in the area. As President Bush worked with the United Nations regarding a resolution on Iraq's violation of international law, he also authorized the Secretary of Defense to mobilize the Army Reserve.²¹ The mobilization of combat support and combat service support units began immediately. Congress became involved in the efforts revolving around mobilization of reservists, and there was much discussion on the topic. While many in Congress wanted to see the Total Force at work, the Secretary of Defense argued there would not be sufficient time to mobilize and train reserve combat units for the mission.²²

The build up of both active and reserve forces continued in Southwest Asia throughout the fall. Army Reserve combat support and service support units were mobilized and deployed. In fact, "...every truck company in the reserve structure, except those in the National Guard divisions", was called.²³ Not all units called up were apportioned or assigned forces for Southwest Asia. Many of the major Army Reserve units aligned with Third Army, Southwest Asia, or had affiliations with other active component units that were deployed to Saudi Arabia were not called up or mobilized for duty.²⁴ There was a clear demonstration that the Total Force policy did not work as it was planned.

There were also other aspects of the Total Force policy that also did not function well. Although Army Reserve units that were aligned or identified to a Southwest Asia commitment had developed post-mobilization training plans, the training plans were often changed so unit training could be accelerated and deployment expedited. Yet other units that were identified, but did not have the requisite personnel readiness to deploy, had soldiers cross-leveled into the unit to make its personnel readiness acceptable.²⁵ Other units that had personnel and/or equipment shortages were fixed at the mobilization stations, which had been part of the plan all

along. After the build up for five months of United States and Coalition forces in Saudi Arabia, the force evolved into a lethal cohesive element that ultimately evicted Iraq from Kuwait in an unanticipated short time. However, larger than the victory over Iraq was the test of the Total Force policy as a part of National Military Strategy.

Operations Desert Shield/Storm proved the Total Force policy had worked in some respects, yet there were still some problems.²⁶ Clearly it did not work as strictly as it had been developed, but it did enable the massive mobilization of Army Reserve units, their preparation for an operation, and deployment. One major element of a Reserve Component mobilization - getting the public behind the mission - proved to be on target during the Operation.²⁷ Some shortcomings identified during the operations led to a much needed commitment between the components for future operations. It is fair to assess that the Army Reserve became more focused on planning for contingencies after the massive call-ups for Operations Desert Shield/Storm.

Overall, Operations Desert Shield/Storm tested the Total Force and proved successful in that its evolution had brought increased recognition of the Army Reserve and its capabilities and inclusion into major war plans. It also led to an increase in funding and equipment to enhance overall readiness. Now as the nation becomes deeply entrenched in its first protracted war of the 21st century, the Army needs its Reserve more than ever. However, much that was developed under the Total Force policy and reviewed/tested as a result of the deployments to Southwest Asia would need to change to enable the Army Reserve to be a compensating leverage for a smaller active component.

Changing the Army Reserve

As a result of the agreement between the Army Reserve, National Guard, and active Army leaders in December 1993,²⁸ the Army Reserve minimized its combat arms units and focused its force structure more on combat support and combat service support units/missions. As one glances back to the type of units that were called up from the Reserve Components during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, the agreement amongst key leaders seemed a logical choice to ensure that the Army Reserve would be called for future operations.

The figures today reflect the Army Reserve currently at 20 percent of total Army forces, with 18 and 36 percent of the combat support and combat service support forces, respectively, (see figure 1). With over 50 percent of Army forces in the Reserve Components, it is easy to understand why the Army cannot accomplish its mission without significant support from the Reserves. Clearly, the shift to the Total Force Policy has created demand for those units.

"Since 1990, the Army has relied more and more on the reserve components to meet demanding mission requirements in support of the National Military Strategy (NMS).²⁹ Likewise, the Army Reserve's unique capabilities almost guarantee a call-up in times of crisis due to its specialties (see figure 2). But the change in structure and focus was not enough to stand the next test of the Total Force.




Figure 1. Total Army Composition Source: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Briefing.



Figure 2. US Army Reserve Support to the Warfighter. Source: Leading Profound Change While Fighting the War Briefing, USAWC, Distance Education Program, 26 July 2005.

Operations Enduring/Iraqi Freedom: The Second Total Force Policy Test

The devastating terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, changed the country forever. One element of our national security that did not change as a result of 9/11 was the use or importance of the military element of national power. Because of the attacks, the military became engaged immediately to secure our nation. The immediate military response was not just from the active component as in the past. First, both active and reserve components assisted in conducting recovery operations at the sites of the devastating attacks. Second, the components provided personnel at key infrastructure throughout the nation to increase security, and reduce the vulnerability for subsequent attacks. Once the President felt the nation was 'more secure,' he ordered the military to engage the enemy overseas.

While the Total Force Policy created a potent team that attempted to bring together an arguably well-sequenced force on a linear battlefield, it did not create the flexibility to tailor packages and rapidly deploy forces abroad. As a result, similar to Operations Desert Shield/Storm, the Army Reserve had to cross-level personnel and equipment to units that were deploying. "Today, on average, 35 percent of the Soldiers in a deploying unit are reassigned from elsewhere."³⁰ The Army Reserve has done quite well in cross-leveling forces to meet the needs, and has not failed in that endeavor.

Whereas the Total Force Policy brought some level of increased predictability for the employment of Army Reserve units based on time-phased force flow data (TPFFD), just as in Operations Desert Shield/Storm, the current, and most likely future, Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous (VUCA) environment has created major problems for TPFFD use. Consequently, it has created command and control challenges as established relationships between active component and Army Reserve units become non-existent. As pointed out in a Government Accounting Office report in August 2003, "DOD did not follow existing operations plans after the events of September 11, 2001, because those plans did not adequately address the mobilization requirements needed to deal with terrorist attacks at home or abroad, or with uncertain overseas deployment requirements."³¹ As a result, the mobilization process was modified to better tailor requirements to the situation. Whereas in the past a TPFFD would be the catalyst for a unit to alert, mobilize, train, and deploy, the Request for Forces (RFF) became the standard for requesting capabilities for mobilization and deployment.

The process of requesting a certain capability via RFF is more precise in articulating exact requirements for a given situation than the TPFFD ever was. While the TPFFD drove the delivery of certain capabilities to the battlefield, the TPFFD was not necessarily tailored to a specific requirement and the "one size fits all" approach resulted. However, a problem arises for

the RFF when in a crisis mode and a hasty, rather than a deliberate, mission analysis results in the drafting of a tailored requirement (RFF) that could either overestimate or underestimate the requisite force for the mission. The result is the mobilization of forces for a mission that may or may not require all the capabilities delivered. The time to go back and ask for additional forces, remission forces, or return forces for demobilization also has negative implications and can be very time consuming. However, one must be concerned about bringing persons with various backgrounds, skillsets, and the like together and hastily mobilizing and deploying them into a combat zone.

The increased cross-leveling of personnel has naturally resulted in closer scrutiny and validation at the mobilization station for deployment abroad. While RC units are generally more cohesive due to their links to communities and personnel that stay in an unit due to its location, the mass transferring of personnel from throughout the Army Reserve to fill shortages has created cohesion and communications problems for deploying units. Fortunately, the Army has now been able to adapt the mobilization process to provide the time for units (and individuals) that have been brought together from various parts of the country to work and train together before reporting to the mobilization station and deploying into harm's way. But all is not perfect with the mobilization process.

Overall, the Army Reserve has done well in the second test of the Total Force Policy. Admittedly, there have been challenges regarding the mobilization process, but when called, the Army Reserve provided the trained personnel and units to complement the active force. Still, now is the time for the Army Reserve to change to be "more ready" and make it a more responsive contributor to the Total Force.

The Army Reserve Expeditionary Force

Like the active Army, the Army Reserve is currently "transforming" to an Expeditionary Force that complements the Army Force Generation (AFORGGEN) model and complies with transformation initiatives of the Joint Force and current National Military Strategy (NMS).³² The Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF) will be a modular force that is tailored (packaged) for missions to ensure that the right size and type forces are ready, properly equipped with current state-of-the-art equipment, and can deploy with minimal delay. Once fully implemented, the AREF concept will allow the Army Reserve to train, equip, and mobilize its forces in a higher state of readiness and more efficient manner than in its history. Funding will be programmed and provided to units for personnel training. Equipment will be based on established timelines as set forth in the AFORGGEN model which will develop forces in three pools.³³

The first pool is the Reset/Train Pool. Units in this pool will remain here for up to three years as they transition from deployment or are short personnel or equipment which renders the unit less than ready in a C4 or C5 status. While assigned to the Reset/Train Pool, a graduated approach to improvement will be implemented. Year one of the model will focus on individual skills. In year two the level of training increases to smaller scale collective training at the squad or crew level. Culmination in this pool is in year three of the cycle with an external evaluation and certification at the company/team level in a Army Reserve Warrior Exercise. Upon successful completion of the three years in this pool, forces are moved into the next pool, the Ready Pool.³⁴

The Ready Pool is the second of the three pools and is a one year period from beginning to end. This phase of ARFORGEN capitalizes on the successes of the first pool and builds upon it with a battalion or company external evaluation. The external evaluation will be conducted by one of the Combat Training Centers and will provide validation and the authority to move the unit into the Available Pool.³⁵

After four years of training, development, and validation in the ARFORGEN cycle, the unit is added to the Available Pool. Units in the Available Pool will be capable of deploying anywhere the nation needs them to support and defend our National Security Strategy objectives. Because units in this pool have previously been validated via an external evaluation, train up and a final validation will be accomplished in short order so the unit can deploy within 72 hours to contribute as a complementary force. The AREF will be a tailored force able to answer the call either as a deployment or contingency expeditionary force.³⁶ While the AREF model is being finalized today, the Army Reserve is currently undergoing changes in many other ways to change the culture of the organization. Developing a pool of trained and ready forces is just one change under the AREF. The Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative will also foster change to provide a more capable force for future missions.

Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative

The Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative (FRRI) is the catalyst for making positive change in the Army Reserve of tomorrow.³⁷ All elements of the FRRI are essential pieces to the AREF, but key are: the establishment of a Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Student (TTHS) account and Delayed Entry Program (DEP); re-engineering the mobilization process, (Train-Mobilize-Deploy); refocusing command and control; correcting structure; improving Human Resources, and lastly, improving individual support by creating an Individual Augmentee

Program.³⁸ All are making contributions to change the culture of the Army Reserve to a warrior based soldier who is part of a vital team.

The TTHS account has been available to the active component for years, but was not available to the reserve components until recently. The lack of a TTHS account degraded unit readiness and was a training detractor because commanders not only had to develop realistic training for duty qualified personnel, but also had to keep the non-qualified soldiers engaged as well. The TTHS account will assign all soldiers to the account in one of the TTHS categories and the soldiers will not be placed in a unit until he/she is military occupational specialty qualified. This burden will now be handled by a central body away from the AREF.³⁹

Reengineering the mobilization process began shortly after September 11th. It became readily apparent that the way the Total Force Policy intended Reserves would be called up via TPFFDs would not work in the future. Therefore, in order to ensure personnel were trained, the training model had to change. The Army Reserve is currently working to transition to the Train-Mobilize-Deploy concept.⁴⁰ This process will fully support the AREF concept.

Refocusing command and control, as well as correcting structure, required a thorough analysis of future requirements and what was unnecessary to build and support the AREF. The current 10 RRCs will be disestablished and four new Regional Readiness Sustainment Commands will be created as well as other functional and operational commands established to synergistically improve readiness and responsiveness. The new functional and operational commands can focus energies on improving readiness of low-density high-skilled soldiers and ensure they are adequately sourced for success.

Lastly, the Army Reserve is leaning forward to adapt to the AREF concept. Army Reserve training strategy disseminated to the USARC's leadership this past year reflected the new "train-alert-deploy" model required of the AREF, as well as set the tone for the requisite culture change to train warriors.⁴¹ Embedded in the strategy are key imperatives regarding the Warrior Ethos and Leading soldiers to be "ready now." The training strategy will prepare units to be added to the ARFORGEN pool. But even if the units are ready to deploy, the authority to mobilize the forces must be in place.

Current Mobilization Authorities

Both the President and Congress clearly have authority vested in law that enables either to mobilize forces for national emergencies or war. However, there are limitations and second, third, and perhaps many additional effects to which mobilization authority is used in response to the emergency. Regardless of the emergency, the Army Reserve must be better organized and

prepared to respond to the emergency and maximize results out of the mobilization period.

Perhaps part of the problem is the current mobilization authorities and limitations.

Title 10, United States Code, Sections 12301, 12302, and 12304 grant the President and Congress certain authorities for mobilizing reserve forces.⁴² Each of the sections pertaining to mobilization of Title 10 has a specific purpose and intent, with implications for the armed forces, the nation, and perhaps the world.⁴³

Section 12301, Full Mobilization must be declared by Congress and can be used in time of war or national emergency. There is no limit to the number of soldiers called up for duty under this section, and the soldiers can be retained on active duty for the duration of the war plus six months. This section, if used as the basis for mobilization, has major implications on the armed forces, but more importantly on the nation as a whole. The last time a full-mobilization occurred was during World War II. A sub-paragraph of section 12301 does allow for volunteers to be called to active duty which does not require Congress declaring war.⁴⁴

Section 12302, Partial Mobilization, is declared by the President in time of national emergency and authorizes no more than 1 million personnel to be called up for 24 months. On September 14, 2001, President Bush ordered the Ready Reserve of the armed forces to active duty by declaring a national emergency as the result of the terrorist attacks on September 11.⁴⁵ Constraints placed upon the armed forces, specifically the number of forces and the duration, in this section can create major personnel/manning issues for a long protracted war such as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Soldiers cannot be ordered to duty for more than 24 months for the duration of the stated emergency. Consequently, inefficient utilization of reserve forces regardless of when it occurs in the mobilization process, negatively impacts on the larger mission.⁴⁶

The last section of law that provides authorization to mobilize soldiers involuntarily, Section 12304, Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up, has been the most commonly used mobilization authority in the history of the reserves. The authority in this section authorizes up to 200,000 from the reserves to be mobilized to augment the active forces for operational missions, not to exceed 270 days. A restriction of this section is that a soldier cannot be involuntarily called up to support the same campaign or operation. (This does not preclude a soldier from volunteering for active duty under section 12301d to support the same campaign or operation.)⁴⁷

As the means to project military power and the shift of forces from active to the reserve components has evolved over time, the legal procedure for mobilization authorities has changed very little. An effective force that is trained and ready when called must have the mobilization

authorities to ensure the active component can take full advantage of the capabilities in the reserves.

Conclusion

Throughout its history, the Army Reserve has been a key player in the National Security and Military Strategies of the United States. Employed extensively between World War I and the Korean War, the Army Reserve was not used as in previous conflicts during the Viet Nam War. Military leaders realized the obvious shortcomings of not including the reserves in Viet Nam and created an environment to include the reserves known as Total Force. The Total Force Policy implemented in 1973 by the Department of Defense and incorporated by Department of the Army ensured the reserves would be called upon in times of major crises. In the 30 plus years since its inception, the policy provided the Army Reserve funding and focus to better prepare its personnel and units to supplement active forces after being mobilized, trained, and prepared for deployment. In 1993, the realignment of combat support and combat service support units into the Army Reserve ensured it would be called up in future crises, as the active component did not have the infrastructure to sustain long-term operations without them.

Although the policy created the force by providing funding and plans for use of the Army Reserve, when the need arose, the active Army did not employ forces as originally conceived.

Total Force Policy has had two significant tests since its inception as a result of world events that have taxed US resolve and stretched the active Army beyond its capabilities. While the policy planned for the utilization of Army Reserve units based on a pre-developed plan and timetable, the first test, Operations Desert Shield/Storm proved that unanticipated timelines and requirements required deviating from policy methodology. Arguably, the active component did not follow its own established procedures. Regardless, the Army Reserve responded to the Army's evolving requirements by realigning personnel and equipment and building the forces required. Although not accomplished as originally planned, the Army Reserve demonstrated it was a key component of the Army Total Force.

In the second test, Operations Enduring/Iraqi Freedom, similar shortcomings in pre-planned timelines and unanticipated requirements developed. Consequently, the Army created the RFF as a means to request capabilities and for the components to develop/tailor forces. Included in the RFF was the timeline dictating when forces should flow into theater. Like previous major operations, the Army did not use established Total Force planning methodology. Regardless, using creativity and demonstrating great flexibility, the Army Reserve rose to the occasion and provided forces and validated it was still a relevant element of the Army

component. Anticipating the future VUCA environment, Army Reserve leadership has modified the organization and instituted various changes to facilitate positive growth.

The FRRI is a major catalyst to facilitate change in the Army Reserve and aid in its transition to a complementary force of the active forces. Many of the factors that have aided the active component over the years are now available to the Army Reserve. For example, the TTHS account and DEP will facilitate better training and readiness of units through managing non-qualified personnel separate from a unit of assignment. Similarly, the use of TTHS and DEP will serve to provide units with a firmer foundation to build the expeditionary force. The AREF will be a more relevant contributing force for the active component because it will provide a more organized and trained force for mobilization.

The AREF will permit the Army Reserve to improve its relevancy to the active component and the nation as part of a Joint Forces package deployed on short notice around the world. By eliminating excess forces from the structure and refocusing the force, the Army Reserve will be leveraged to answer the call. In the current and future VUCA environment, tailored packages will be what the Army requires. Of course, no one can predict whether or not the tailored packages will have to be further tailored when a future conflict arises. The ARFORGEN model of a 5-year rotational force goes a step beyond WARTRACE in that it focuses energies and funding now on certain units throughout the cycle to prepare and ensure there is a ready set available for call up when needed. While there is much uncertainty how unit apportionment will drive the AREF process, it is a given the Army Reserve force structure will remain an integral and relevant part of any future Army operation.

Recommendations

First and foremost, Congress must make funding available to fill the personnel and equipment requirements of the AREF, and to ensure soldiers receive required skills training in a timely manner. As the AREF is further developed, it could become necessary to provide additional funding and statutory training days to allow forces to train and maintain readiness. Likewise, funding for equipment of the forces in the training pool must be available to set the forces on the right path in the ARFORGEN model.

Second, as the Army identifies missions and/or assets currently in the Army Reserve that will no longer contribute to the mission, Members of Congress should minimize their involvement in the process to 'save' structure (constituents) for his/her district. The Army must have the flexibility to determine what assets are critical to defend the nation. That determination should not be made based on political agendas. Excessive structure, retained for whatever

purposes, will create a significant burden on the AREF and should be reduced as quickly and efficiently after the decision to eliminate a requirement.

Third, as much as possible, the active Army must ensure the Army Reserve forces required for a mission are drawn from the available pool and not from another pool in the model. If forces are not in the available pool, they should be drawn from the active component first, then from the Army Reserve. The requirement for follow-on capabilities can come from the Army Reserve because it will provide enough time to build and train forces. However, transitioning forces from the Train/Reset or Ready pools will create disruption in the ARFORGEN model and will compound planning and sourcing problems for future Army Reserve missions. It will also negatively impact deployment predictability for Reserve citizen-soldiers and could perhaps lead to future retention/recruiting difficulties.

Lastly, as the AREF concept matures, Congress should consider combining the various mobilization authorities into one authority. One key tenant of the AREF is for the force to be ready and able to deploy on short notice. The current authorities with different personnel caps and requirements create confusion and impose barriers which delay or deny the early call up and integration of reserve forces. Future military operations, regardless of whether it is combat, humanitarian, or anything in between, will most likely require the Reserve Components to support its active forces in significantly less time than in past operations. The President should have call-up authority to bring on the Reserve Components in the strength required, for the period required, early on in the process and not be restricted by personnel caps. The services (and Congress if necessary) can manage the number of mobilized reservists to reduce the possibility of overextending the reserve. Allowing early call up of the Army Reserve could enhance overall planning efforts and serve to more predictably forecast and utilize Army Reserve forces in the effort. Similarly, the earlier use of Army Reserve forces could enable better integration of the force through the mutual use and reliance on all components.

The Army Reserve has evolved over its 98 year history to being a key contributor in the nation's defense. From World War I to Operation Iraqi Freedom, it has responded, when called, with trained and ready personnel and units. The Army Reserve proved it was relevant when it answered the call of the first Total Force Policy test in Operations Desert Shield/Storm; and it is still demonstrating its relevance today as it answers the calls for Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. In the past, the Army Reserve had time to prepare its forces after alert to prepare for deployment. In the future, the alert to deployment timeline will be reduced significantly. The Army Reserve is leaning forward with the transformation to the AREF which will make the Army Reserve of tomorrow even more relevant to the Army than it is today.

Endnotes

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